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Risk Assessments for Chemical Stockpile




Chemical stockpiles that consist of chemical warfare agents and
their containers remain in finite quantities and in various degrees of
repair at nine U.S. Army installations. 1 Congress and the Chemical
Weapons Convention are committed to destroying the entire stockpile
by the year 2007.2 Achieving this goal, in most instances, will be by
incineration. Unlike standard risk assessments that evaluate chemical
releases that have historically occurred, Chemical Stockpile Incinerator
(CSI) risk assessments anticipate the attendant risks to human and
ecological receptors in the vicinity of planned incinerators. They also
determine whether or not a CSI can first be constructed, or
appropriately engineered in the case of those already in the construction
phase, through the use of a pass/fail determination scheme.
Procedurally, CSI risk assessments model incinerator combustion
products as they are: 1) released into the air as stack emissions; 2)
deposited onto soil, plants, and waterbodies; and 3) taken up into
certain terrestrial and aquatic biota. Modeled chemical-specific
* The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent
those of the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. The
author wishes to thank Dr. Gene Whelan, of Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
for his technical support with the vadose zone modeling exercise. The author also wishes to
thank Mr. Tony Pitrat, of the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and
Preventive Medicine, for his assistance in calculating soil concentration decay rates and for his
thorough review of the manuscript.
** Mr. Tannenbaum ig an ecologist and a risk assessor for human health and ecological risk,
employed by the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He received his B.A. and M.S. degrees in biology
from the City College of The City University of New York. E-mail: eltann@juno.com.
I See National Research Council, Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents
and Munitions (1994).
2 See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction (October 1993).
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concentrations in each instance are then used to evaluate applicable
routes of exposure in human, and non-human, species. Contaminant
fate and transport process information is used to assist the modeling
effort, as well as site-specific meteorological data when it exists.
The level of trust and confidence in CSI risk assessment outcomes
needs to be at a near maximum level for two reasons. First, because CSI
risk assessments precede construction of the incinerators they are
evaluating, only predictive risk assessment methods can be used. There
is no opportunity for field verification of estimated results (e.g.,
estimated soil concentrations resulting from stack emissions). Thus,
CSI risk assessments bear an inherent and unavoidable uncertainty term
that the risk manager must confront when reviewing the assessment's
findings. Second, there is a great deal riding on a "pass" outcome when
employing a pass/fail assessment determination scheme. A planned CSI
will only operate long enough to incinerate the finite quantities of
chemical stockpile presently stored at specific Army installations, with
the longest incineration period estimated to be six years. In effect, a
"pass" sanctions the expenditure of up to $1 billion for planned, or
ongoing, construction of a one-time use incinerator with a period of
performance as brief as two years. A "pass" is in effect saying that
during CSI operation, or in a specified post-operation period, there are
no unacceptable risks to human or ecological receptors within a 50
kilometer radius of the proposed incinerator site.
Can the supporting incinerator risk assessment guidance assume
such awesome responsibility and provide the assurance that CSIs, when
operational, are protective of nearby receptors? There is reason to
suspect that it cannot. Existing health risk assessment guidance for
combustor emissions was developed for applications with conventional
(i.e., long-term or ongoing operation) combustion facilities, and not for
the single-release event, short-term operations that typify a CSI.3
3 See N.C. Dep't of Health, Env't, and Natural Res., North Carolina Protocol for
Performing Indirect Exposure Risk Assessment for Hazardous Waste Combustion Units
(January 1997); U.S. Envrl. Prot. Agency (U.S. EPA), Methodology for Assessing Health Risk
Associated With Indirect Exposure to Combustor Emissions: Interim Final (1990); U.S. EPA,
Addendum to the Methodology for Assessing Health Risks Associated with Indirect Exposure
to Combustor Emissions (1993); U.S. EPA, Risk Assessment Implementation Guidance for
Performing Screening Level Risk Analyses at Combustion Facilities Burning Hazardous Waste
(April 22, 1994); U.S. EPA, Errata, Risk Assessment Implementation Guidance for Performing
Screening Level Risk Analyses at Combustion Facilities Burning Hazardous Wastes (1994);
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Whereas the guidance acknowledges the proliferation of conventional
incinerators that provide an alternative means to land disposal of
municipal solid waste and sewage sludge, it fails to identify the need to
evaluate risks from CSI releases, and neglects to mention this unique
brand of incinerator altogether. Given these concerns, the supporting
guidance was evaluated for its capability to support critical pass/fail
determinations at a CSI. An analysis of three elements of CSI risk
assessments that commonly relate to constituent quantities in soil - 1)
the characterization of the background condition; 2) the estimation of
constituent concentrations in both surface and subsurface soils; and 3)
the evaluation of risk at an installation's fenceline - reveals
inadequacies in the guidance that can arguably lead to unreliable, and
underestimated, assessments of risk.
Background Characterization
The available guidance offers two approaches for characterizing
background in terms of constituent levels, with "background" defined
as the pre-existing (i.e., prior to CSI operation) environmental media
concentrations at locations within a 50-kilometer radius of a CSI, where
actual or hypothetical receptors are to be placed and evaluated. 4
Either a default baseline risk level may be assigned to the locations,
acknowledging the presence of constituents from other sources already
there, or field sampling may occur. Superficially, the guidances' default
levels appear generous in ascribing baseline risk to critical site locations.
Conventionally, a Hazard Index (HI) of 1.0 (indicating that a
receptor's chemical intake and a safe dose are the same) is taken to
represent a threshold-for-effect level in noncancer assessments. The
guidance recommends assigning a noncancer HI for human health risk
of 0.75 at the locations in recognition of potential hazard-posing
contaminants that stem from sources other than the planned CSI. An
apparently conservative stratagem that sets the baseline hazard level to
0.75 means that the estimated noncancer HI attributable to the CSI
must not be any greater than 0.25 in order for the CSI to "pass" the
U.S. EPA, Guidance for Performing Screening Level Risk Analysis at Combustion Facilities
Burning Hazardous Wastes (December 14, 1994); U.S. EPA, Risk Assessment Support to the
Development of Technical Standards for Emissions From Combustion Units Burning
Hazardous Wastes (1996).
4 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (1990), (1993), (April 22, 1994), supra note 3.
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first tier risk assessment that supports a construction permit. However,
use of the 0.75 baseline hazard level may be underprotective in the case
of metals, as discussed below, with regard to estimated surficial soil
concentrations. Similarly, the guidance recommends that at the critical
locations, there be no greater than 1E-05 excess cancer risk attributable
to the CSI. This default adds a full order of magnitude of stringency to
CSI pass/fail determinations over that which characterizes the "trigger"
for remedial action considerations in the EPA's Superfund Program.
Although not stated in the guidance, the rationale for the non-
requirement to sample may be the excessive cost involved with chemical
analysis. Typically, there may be as many as 100 or more constituents
within a combustion facility's emissions stream that are of interest
within a risk assessment framework. Furthermore, 10% of these are
dioxins and furans, which are more expensive analytes to test for.
Regardless of the rationale behind the guidances' providing options for
addressing the baseline condition, it is important to note that the
sampling approach has yet to be exercised in CSI risk assessments. This
may be unfortunate, for a baseline sampling effort could reveal that the
surrounding environment already bears unacceptable risk levels for
human and ecological receptors. Such a case is reasonable, considering
that most of the Army's proposed CSI locations have within their
critical radius one or more significant contamination sources, many in
the form of an operating Conventional Incinerator Complex (CIC). As
an example, in a recent CSI risk assessment, a CIC was located
approximately six kilometers from the proposed CSI location, and had
been in operation for 20 years. 5 Although the processes feed at a CIC
differs from that of a CSI, the emission stream constituents are quite
similar to those of a CSI. In this case then, accumulated quantities of
constituents from the CIC alone may have been responsible for a HI in
excess of 0.75. In that event, the guidances' default risk level would not
have been sufficiently protective.
The non-requirement to sample the baseline condition overlooks a
fundamental issue that a CSI risk assessment needs to address: "Is the
5 See U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Final Screening
Risk Assessment, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, Risk Assessment No. 39-
EJ-1401-97, Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff,
Arkansas (1997).
Tannenbaum: Risk Assessments for Chemical Stockpile Incinerators 271
proposed CSI location, and its surrounding environment, already too
contaminated to receive the additional constituent loadings that a
future incinerator would be contributing?" Should the environment be
too contaminated, either significant design changes for the incinerator
would have to occur, or an alternative technology for the destruction of
a stockpile would have to be considered. Shortcomings of the
guidances' default baseline risk levels become apparent when two
critical realizations are made. First, as there are no outright barriers to
the collection of background data, the absolute baseline condition
could be known. Considering the multitude of uncertainty sources in
CSI risk assessments, collecting background data could eliminate nearly
all of the uncertainty associated with this vital risk assessment
parameter. Additionally, although default baseline risk levels can fill the
void that remains when sampling does not occur, there is a limitation to
their use. The conservatism they offer is compromised as the number of
nearby contaminating sources and the duration of their releases
increase.
The second realization is that efforts to model contaminant
concentrations in the environment demonstrate a repeated history of
underestimation. A recent study evaluating the efficacy of food chain
model predictions by numerous international teams supports this.6 A
decade after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, researchers set out to
estimate quantities of Cesium (137Cs), a fission product that readily
assimilates in plant and animal tissue, and other released radionuclides,
in environmental media a few hundred miles to the north in Finland.
Knowledge of the time and location of the Chernobyl release, and the
fallout being readily distinguishable from other environmental
contamination, allowed for field measurements to be gathered at
specific locations. A comparison of the predicted 137 Cs concentrations
in agricultural products, freshwater fish, small and large game, and
daily intakes (the same contaminant reservoirs evaluated in CSI risk
assessments), and comprehensive field measurements of 137 Cs, revealed
that the researchers had all produced underestimates. Other examples
of fate and transport modeling underestimation are recent reports that
the estimated global depositions to soil of chlorinated dioxins and
6 See Kathleen M. Thiessen et al., Environmental Models Undergo International Test, 31
Envd. Sci. Technol. 358 (1997).
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dibenzofurans, frequent risk drivers in CSI risk assessments, may be
four to 20 times higher than the emissions from known sources. 7
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that CSI risk assessments are also
predicated on underestimated constituent quantities in environmental
media.
In the event that analytical chemistry cost is the driving force
behind the guidances' non-requirement for background sampling, the
logic for this argument is debatable in the case of a CSI. Construction
and operation costs for a given installation-specific CSI will likely
exceed $1 billion. Analytical chemistry costs for approximately 100
constituents in samples collected at a few select locations can be
factored into a total project cost that is workable to all stakeholders.
More importantly, this relatively minor expenditure would remove
from CSI risk assessments their most conspicuous and unique of data
gaps - a lacking background term.
A final related consideration concerns the ongoing practice of
conducting trial, or test burns, of the few already constructed
incinerators. The practice furnishes risk assessors with better data for the
deposition modeling of stack emission constituents. The trial burns are
themselves costly, approaching $500,000 each, as are the labor costs in
having modelers and risk assessors process the successively refined data
generated by the trial burns. A singular analytical chemistry round to
provide the background constituents concentrations in soil and other
media, at a significantly lower cost than a trial burn, would remove a
substantial uncertainty surrounding the baseline risk level in a CSI risk
assessment.
Estimated Surficial Soil Concentrations
The estimated soil concentrations of constituents released through
CSI emissions represent the underpinning of the CSI risk assessment.
Every exposure pathway to human and ecological receptors, other than
inhalation, is fueled by the chemical-specific soil concentration term.
7 See Louis P. Brzuzy & Ronald A. Hites, Global Mass Balance for Polychlorinated
Dibenzo-p-dioxins and Dibenzofurans, 30 Envtl. Sci. Technol. 1797 (1996); Joseph N.S.
Eisenberg et al., Chemical Dynamics of Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Sensitivity Analysis
Relating Soil Concentration Levels to Atmospheric Emissions, 32 Envtl. Sci. Technol. 115
(1998).
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Given the dependency of the numerous risk outcomes on the soil
concentration, it is imperative that the term not be underestimated.
In the absence of guidance specific to the CSI case, risk assessors
have adopted the practice of assuming that constituent quantities in soil
are maximal at the end of a CSI's period of performance. As a
conservative measure, this calculated concentration is used in the risk
assessments, and with the additional conservative assumption that this
concentration does not change with time. I investigated the reliability
of the estimated soil concentrations at a CSI's installation fenceline,
produced when using the soil equations that are provided in the relevant
guidance. 8 The focus of the investigation, for both a series of metals
and the organic compounds that commonly appear as .risk drivers in
CSI risk assessments, was the chemical-specific loss terms of the
equations.
In the case of metals deposited in the upper centimeter of soil, the
soil equations describe two chemical-specific loss terms: runoff (ksr)
and leaching (ksl). An approximate theoretical maximum upper
centimeter concentration for the metals at the fenceline was first
established for a recently assessed CSI that is scheduled to operate for
3.3 years. This was accomplished by using the soil equations and
adjusting the soil loss term for the combined effects of runoff and
leaching to a value of 1%. These theoretical maximum concentrations
were then compared with the estimated installation fenceline
concentrations recorded in the final risk assessment that had been
prepared for that CSI. 9 The risk assessment's reduced concentrations,
when compared with the theoretical maximum concentrations, are
noteworthy as illustrated in Table 1. The equations appear to be
exaggerating the fraction of deposited material that is lost from the soil
system. For five of thirteen metals, for example, the guidance's
equations are responsible for producing surface soil concentrations
where there is more than a 92% reduction from the calculated
theoretical maximum condition. More importantly, these significant
losses represent surface soil concentrations potentially underestimated
by as little as 25% to as much as 100 times.
8 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (April 22, 1994), Errata (1994), (December 14, 1994),
(1996), supra note 3; Eisenberg, supra note 7; U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency, Human Health Risk
Assessment Protocol for Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities: Peer Review Draft (1998).
9 See U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, supra note 5.
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 267 [Fall 2000]
Table 1
Comparison of Estimated Soil Concentrations in Upper Centimeter
at End of CSI's Period of Performance
Metal Theoretical Estimated Percentage Metals Ratio:
Maximum Concentration** Loss (Runoff and Theoretical Maximum
Concentration Using Guidance Leaching) From Concentration to
(mg/kg) (mg/kg) Theoretical Maximum Guidance-produced
When Using Guidance Concentration
Antimony 4.51E-4 6.51E-6 98.6 69.3
Arsenic 1.15E-3 1.38E-4 88.0 8.3
Barium 2.4E-3 1.92E-3 20.0 1.25
Beryllium 3.03E-4 8.34E-5 72.5 3.63
Cadmium 4.81E-4 2.4E-4 50.1 2.0
Chromium 1.44E-3 1.11E-4 92.3 12.97
Lead 3.98E-3 3.98E-3 0.0 1.0
Mercury 6.95E-4 6.93E-4 0.0 1.0
Nickel 3.04E-3 9.59E-4 68.5 3.17
Selenium 4.61E-4 1.06E-5 97.7 43.5
Silver 1.49E-4 1.5E-6 99.0 99.3
Thallium 1.48E-2 4.3E-3 71.0 3.44
Tin 2.2E-4 2.2E-6 99.0 100.0
*Soil equation used is from Table B-1-1 (page 3 of 11) of U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (1998),
supra note 8.
**See U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Final Screening Risk
Assessment, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, supra note 5.
Based on this somewhat crude exercise, several difficulties arising
from use of the guidance become apparent. First, the findings are not
plausible. Realistically, such substantial quantities of metals would not
be lost this quickly because it is their nature to largely be retained in
terrestrial systems. Second, substantial losses did not occur for all
metals. Lead and mercury exhibited no loss, which is the expectation
for all of the metals. Although this paper's purpose is to identify
inadequacies of supporting guidance for CSI risk assessments, and not
to identify potentially faulty equation components, it appears that the
default soil loss constant values provided in the guidance (for the
combined runoff and leaching components), ks, are responsible for the
excessive reductions in soil concentration. This is evident in Table 2
which provides both the ks values derived from guidance equations for
the metals evaluated, and the estimated times for maximum surficial
soil concentrations (i.e., from the end of the period of performance) to
be reduced to a value that is 1% of that figure. 10
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Aside from confirming the losses reported in Table 1, another
critical observation is now apparent. With concentration decays of two
orders of magnitude for tin, silver, antimony, and selenium occurring in
as little as three to 100 days after incinerator shut-down (i.e., when the
contaminant source is removed), it appears that during CSI operation,
the ks term is preventing these and other metals from attaining what
would be vastly higher accumulations in soil by the time of CSI shut-
down. In contrast, the estimated time from maximum concentration to
1% of maximum for lead and mercury extends to the thousands of
years (see Table 2). This suggests that the default ks values for these
metals significantly underplay the natural soil loss processes. Thus, the
risk assessment's reported concentrations of these two metals are
probably not underestimates, but rather overestimates.
Table 2
Metal Concentration Decay Following CSI Period of Performance
Metal ks Effective Half-life Estimated Time for
in Soil (days) Maximum Concentration to
Reach 1% of Maximum (days)
Tim 566.900 2E-01 3
Silver 141.725 9E-01 10
Antimony 35.431 4E+00 50
Selenium 17.050 8E+00 100
Chromium 4.168 3E+01 400
Arsenic 2.594 5E+01 600
Beryllium 1.078 1E+02 2,000
Thallium 1.020 1E+02 2,000
Nickel 0.920 1E+02 2,000
Cadmium 0.472 3E+02 4,000
Barium 0.143 9E+02 10,000
Mercury 0.001 1E+05 1,000,000
Lead 0.009 2E+05 2,000,000
The ramifications of underestimated surficial soil concentrations are
profound. All previous "passing" CSI risk assessments are reasonably
suspect, especially those where borderline risk (e.g., an HI just below
0.25) was described. With exposure point concentrations having been
underestimated, terrestrial exposures in turn, such as human
consumption of homegrown vegetables, have undoubtedly been
10 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (April 22, 1994), Errata (1994), supra note 3.
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underestimated as well. In a related observation, findings of acceptable
risk at conventional combustion facilities may also be suspect, because
of the under-reporting of metals in soil. This may suggest that re-
evaluations at these facilities may be in order. Furthermore, the under-
reporting of metals concentrations in soil impacts the assessment of risk
at the aquatic components of a site. This is because the guidance, in
part, uses the surficial soil concentration to estimate the surface water
concentration of nearby onsite waterbodies. An underestimated surficial
soil concentration also means that there is less metal available to migrate
to surface water via runoff mechanisms, contributing to the surface
water concentration.
Table 3
Comparative Soil Losses of Selected Organic Species Deposited by a CSI
Chemical Theoretical Estimated Total Loss of % Total % Total % Total % Total
Maximum Concentration Compound Loss as Loss as Loss as Loss as
Concentration (mg/kg)* Using (%) ksg ksv ksr ksl
(mg/kg) Guidance
TCDD 5.02E-9 3.89E-9 23.0 43.40 54.9 0.4 1.3
(as 2,3,7,8 TCDD)
PCDD 3.24E-9 2.82E-9 13.0 81.03 15.7 0.7 2.5
HxCDD 4.02E-9 3.56E-9 11.5 94.00 5.7 0.1 0.2
HpCDD 4.48E-9 4.0E-9 10.7 98.49 1.4 0.0 0.1
OCDD 4.23E-9 3.79E-9 10.4 99.55 0.0 0.1 0.3
TCDF 1.16E-6 9.32E-7 19.7 51.70 45.6 0.6 2.1
PCDF 7.64E-4 6.65E-4 13.3 78.66 19.7 0.4 1.3
HxCDF 1.19E-3 1.05E-3 11.8 85.25 14.0 0.2 0.6
HpCDF 2.4E-3 2.10E-3 12.5 82.83 17.0 0.0 0.1
OCDF 3.08E-4 2.75E-4 10.7 99.88 0.1 0.0 0.0
* See U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Final Screening Risk
Assessment, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, supra note 5.
In the case of organic compounds deposited onto the ground, in
addition to the previously described ksr and ksl, the guidances' soil
equations include chemical-specific loss factors for degradation (ksg;
for dioxin only) and volatilization (ksv). For the evaluation of the
efficacy of the soil equations here, each of the four loss terms were set
to a value of 1% to generate theoretical maximum concentrations for
comparisons with values reported in the final risk assessment. As is
evident from Table 3, the overall loss at the end of the period of
performance appears reasonable, approximately 10% to 20%.
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Furthermore, the percentage of the loss that is attributable to the
combined effects of runoff and leaching is most minimal (0% to
3.2%). Unlike the metals, the organic compounds from CSI stack
emissions are probably not being underestimated in the soil with the use
of the relevant guidance. The analysis of the relative contributions of
the four loss mechanisms, however, sheds some light on where the soil
equations for metals may have gone awry. For the dioxins and furans
evaluated, Table 3 shows the percentage of the total soil loss, as ksr and
ksl, to be variable. In the case of the thirteen metals however, the
partitioning of the soil loss, which is not shown, was found to be
identical for each (with 22.4% attributed to ksr and 77.6% attributed
to ksl), suggesting an idiosyncrasy of the equations.
Estimated Constituent Concentrations in Soil at Depth
CSI risk assessments commonly evaluate the indirect exposures of
human and ecological receptors to soil constituents at depth when
considering the consumption of below-ground and above-ground
plants. In this context, the guidance recommends estimating
constituent concentrations at the 20 centimeter depth, where plant root
systems initiate the contaminant uptake process.11 Chemical-specific
root uptake factors are applied to estimate below-ground plant
concentrations, and if needed, a below-ground-to-above-ground
transfer factor is applied to achieve the tissue concentration in the
plant's above-ground edible portions. As with the estimated surficial
soil constituent concentrations, it is equally important that constituent
concentrations at this critical depth not be underestimated. The finding
of a potentially significant underestimation of metals concentrations in
surface soils, noted above, suggested a complementary analysis to
investigate the efficacy of the guidance's soil equations to produce
accurate concentration estimates at the 20 centimeter depth.
As previously mentioned, risk assessors have inferred from the
available guidance that media constituent concentrations are at their
maximum at the end of a CSI's period of performance. Although this
assumption is reasonable for certain exposures (e.g., inhalation and
surface soil contact), it may not be reasonable for the plant
11 See N.C. Dep't of Health, Env't, and Natural Res., supra note 3; U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency (1990), (1993), (April 22, 1994), supra note 3.
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consumption pathway of a CSI risk assessment. This is because a time
lag of some order is necessary for the constituents to first appear at the
20 centimeter depth. Nevertheless, the guidance's soil equations are
used routinely to compute 20 centimeter depth concentrations that are
expected to occur when the CSI ceases operation. The only factor
differentiating the equations used in computing constituent
concentrations at variable soil depths is a singular term for soil mixing.
Aside from the equations' simplistic method for estimating
concentrations at depth, an additional method limitation is that it
predicts constituent concentrations that linearly decrease with depth, an
unlikely condition to arise in the field. Since sophisticated models exist
that track the fate and transport of constituents in the vadose zone, the
intent of the investigation was to compare metal concentrations at 20
centimeters achieved through modeling of the previously described
theoretical maximum concentrations at the surface, with those
produced using the guidance's equations. The results of the
comparison, and two shortcomings of the guidance, are presented in
Tables 4 and 5.
The modeling was implemented within the environmental software
platform FRAMES 12 using the multimedia model MEPAS, 13 which
includes source term and vadose zone models, as well as other
transport, exposure, and risk assessment models. 14 The first piece of
12 See Gene Whelan et. al., Framework for Risk Analysis in Multimedia Environmental
Systems (FRAMES), in Proceedings of the Workshops on Review of Dose Modeling
Methods for Demonstration of Compliance With The Radiological Criteria for License
Termination (Tj. Nicholson & J.D. Parrot, eds., 1998).
13 See Gene Whelan et al., An Overview of the Multimedia Assessment Methodology
MEPAS, 9 Haz. Waste Haz. Mat. (2):1 (1992).
14 Regarding the source (i.e., the surficial soil concentrations that were modeled), several
assumptions were made. The contamination was assumed to be uniformly distributed within
the one centimeter thick topsoil control volume, and assumed to exist in the source prior to
release. The porosity, bulk density, and infiltration (which includes irrigation) were assumed to
be 20%, 1.5 g/cm3, and 97.98 cm/yr, respectively. The rate of contaminant release from the
source through leaching was based on solutions to differential equations for Completely Stirred
Tank Reactors, and was assumed to be auto-correlated to the mass remaining in the source,
accounting for losses through volatilization, surface runoff, and natural degradation. As the
contaminant inventory in the source decreased with time, the rate of release correspondingly
decreased. Regarding transport, time-varying contaminant concentrations were calculated
within the vadose zone at nineteen centimeters from the bottom of the source, using solutions
to the one-dimensional, advective dispersing equation, and assuming constant infiltration and
first order degradation, to account for losses from natural degradation. As with the source,
porosity, bulk density, and infiltration were assumed to be 20%, 1.5g/cm3, and 97.98cm/yr,
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useful information provided by the FRAMES-MEPAS modeling effort
is that peak concentrations are achieved for nine of the ten metals
shown in Table 4, some time after the end of the CSI's period of
performance. Tin in the modeling exercise had no estimated
accumulations occurring over an infinite time course. Furthermore, for
all but one of the metals, this later occurrence still falls within the 30-
year window of evaluation for effects that CSI risk assessments
regularly consider. Thus it cannot be said that the risk assessments are
necessarily evaluating the most conservative case, as the guidance-
inferred assumption of worst case conditions occurring at the end of
CSI operation, appears to be flawed.
Table 4
Comparison of Guidance-based and Modeled 20 cm Soil Concentrations (mg/kg)
Metal Guidance-based Highest Ratio: Occurrence of Modeled
Concentration* Modeled Modeled/ Post-CSI Operation Peak
at End of CSI Concentration Guidance-based Concentration (years)
Operation in First 30 Years
Post CSI Operation
Antimony 3.73E-05 2.95E-05 0.79 3.97
Arsenic 5.96E-05 7.48E-05 1.26 12.69
Beryllium 1.54E-05 2.37E-05 1.54 25.30
Cadmium 2.42E-05 3.36E-06 0.14 51.40
Chromium 7.96E-05 9.37E-05 1.18 9.11
Nickel 1.54E-04 1.97E-04 1.28 29.10
Selenium 2.98E-05 3.02E-05 1.01 4.75
Silver 3.16E-05 9.76E-06 0.31 3.47
Tm 1.34E-4 0.0 ..........
Thallium 7.54E-04 9.63E-04 1.28 27.10
* See U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Final Screening Risk
Assessment, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B, supra note 5.
A second finding evident in Table 4 is that there are five cases where
the FRAMES-MEPAS modeled concentration of a metal is greater
than that resulting from the guidances' use. Although the modeled
concentrations are only 18% to 54% higher, the overall risk could be
influenced by these increases. Furthermore, an evaluation of a broader
suite of analytes could reveal more cases of this phenomenon, and
respectively. See also, Warren Viessman, Jr. & Mark J. Hammer, Water Supply and Pollution
Control (4th ed. 1985).
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perhaps with greater ratios of modeled-to-guidance-driven
concentrations than shown in this paper. An additional noteworthy
finding is that the five metals with greater modeled concentrations than
guidance-based ones, have their peak concentrations occurring at more
than just one or two years post-CSI operation. This is unlike the pattern
displayed by those metals where the guidance-based concentrations
were higher than the modeled ones (e.g., antimony and silver).
The modeling exercise reveals another contamination pattern
feature (see Table 5) for metals at depth. For barium, lead, and
mercury, there are no accumulations at the 20 centimeter depth during
the 30-year window of interest. This is not to say that these metals
never appear at lower soil strata. Rather, after a considerable time lag,
ranging from the hundreds to the thousands of years, these metals do
occur at the 20 centimeter depth, and at concentrations similar to the
other metals that had their peak concentrations occur much earlier
(Table 4).
Table 5
Comparison of Peak 20 cm. Soil Concentrations (mg/kg)
and Their Occurrence for Certain Metals
Metal Peak Concentration Highest Concentration Occurrence of
in First 30 Years Achieved at Any Time Highest Modeled
Post CSI Operation Concentration
(Years Post CSI Operation)
Barium 0.0 1.56E-04 170.3
Cadmium 3.36E-6 3.13E-05 51.4
Lead 0.0 2.59E-04 27,603.0
Mercury 0.0 4.52E-05 16,800.0
The long delay until lead and mercury's detection at 20 centimeters
corroborates the finding above - that these two metals have surficial
soil concentrations that essentially match the theoretical maximum
concentrations that were constructed. As these two metals demonstrate
such a high degree of retention at the surface, their eventual appearance
at 20 centimeters, and especially their attaining peak concentrations
there, would be expected to be greatly time-shifted. To the extent that
all metals should have had significantly higher surficial soil
concentrations at the fenceline at the end of the period of performance,
this lengthy delay until appearance at 20 centimeters would be
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expected for them as well. In the case of cadmium, however, Table 5
indicates a different condition. Here the peak concentration occurring
overall, at 51.4 years post-CSI operation, is nearly an order of
magnitude higher than that which occurs during the first 30 years after
CSI operation. Although other metals may not be of interest so many
years post-CSI operation, cadmium and other analytes of the CSI
emission stream might first contribute (significantly) to risk at this
advanced time.
Fenceline Risk
The available guidance recommends that risk assessments adopt the
approach of assuming human receptors of concern are situated at an
installation's fenceline where, as previously mentioned, constituent
concentrations are assumed to be at their maximum. 15 Thus, CSI risk
assessments evaluate hypothetically placed receptors, such as subsistence
farmers residing downwind of the proposed incinerator at the
installation's perimeter, although the fenceline may not be a reasonable
location for them. Undeniably this approach is highly conservative,
because maximum exposure scenarios are sometimes artificially
constructed. One would expect the guidance to recommend evaluating
risk to ecological receptors at the fenceline as well, if for no reason other
than to maintain parity between the two evaluations. The analysis here,
however, shows a disconnect between the level of conservatism sought
after in the human health and ecological risk assessments at CSI.
None of the final available risk assessment guidance documents for
combustion incinerators address the assessment of ecological risk, other
than their recommending that estimated constituent concentrations in
surface water be compared to relevant water quality criteria for the
protection of aquatic species. A CSI risk assessment could potentially
ignore all conventionally evaluated exposures that occur within
ecosystem components (e.g., terrestrial food-chain effects), and still be
termed a complete effort. For CSI risk assessments already produced,
"passing" determinations may not have factored in any more ecological
considerations than the surface water comparison mentioned above.
15 See U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency (1990), (1993), (April 22, 1994), supra note 3.
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Putting this situation aside for the moment, current guidance in
draft significantly expands on the dimensions that ecological risk
assessments should take when assessing risk at combustion facilities.1 6
The guidance recommends identifying ecosystems and sensitive
habitats in the "assessment area." Although the intent is to identify
appropriate receptors and sensitive habitats within the critical 50-
kilometer radius of an incinerator, there is the potential for ecological
risk to be underestimated with this practice. Through implementing the
draft guidance, the mapped areas of desirable ecosystems and sensitive
ecological habitats could all fall beyond the fenceline, and possibly far
from the proposed CSI site. Since there is no required number of
communities to be evaluated, and no requirement that receptors be
evaluated at or within the fenceline, ecological receptors that invariably
occur there can be overlooked. Whereas hypothetically placed human
receptors are evaluated at the fenceline, ecological receptors almost
assuredly located there may not be.
Frequently, habitat quality is reduced when it lies within close
proximity of areas with a high degree of human activity. Terrestrial
habitat at an installation's fenceline therefore may well reflect human-
induced disturbances. Although habitat quality at the fenceline may be
significantly reduced when compared with more optimal locations
beyond the fenceline but still within the assessment area, it is unlikely
that the installation fenceline is devoid of ecological receptors that are
commonly selected as assessment endpoints and their prey. Terrestrial
food chains centered about the fenceline then (where maximum
constituent soil concentrations are assumed) are reasonable to consider,
even if the ecological risk assessments performed are no more than
screening level assessments. For this reason, such evaluations are
routinely performed in conventional (i.e., post contaminant-release) risk
assessments at Army sites. Failure to evaluate the common terrestrial
food chain of the soil-invertebrate-small-rodent-raptor (where
applicable at a CSI installation's fenceline), for example, is to bypass an
opportunity to evaluate risk where it may be greatest. This is the clear
intent of the evaluations of human exposures at the fenceline.
16 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Screening Level Ecological Risk Assessment Protocol for
Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities: Peer Review Draft (1999).
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Discussion
The issues presented above strongly suggest that several
inadequacies are apparent in the guidance documents used to support
CSI risk assessments. These inadequacies may stem from the
assumption that the existing guidance, developed for use with
conventional incinerators, is also applicable to the CSI case. As a
consequence of the guidances' use, the conservatism the risk assessments
are intended to display appears to be compromised; potentially "pass"
determinations may in fact be "fails." However, it may be that the
demonstrated cases of lacking conservatism are relatively insignificant,
outweighed by other truly conservative features in the assessments,
whether these follow from the use of the guidance cited or not. As an
example, an assumption that may be made in CSI risk assessments is
that all metals released in stack emissions are in their most toxic form.
Employing this assumption could override the underestimated metals
concentrations in surface and subsurface soils reported here. A
sensitivity analysis of the numerous assumptions provided in the various
guidance documents would first have to be conducted to see how
critically the observations made in this paper impact on the overall
outcome of CSI risk assessments.
The four issues discussed above should nevertheless be considered
for two reasons. First, they identify approaches that can be taken to
increase the level of trust in CSI risk assessment outcomes, where the
risk assessor is confined solely to the use of predictive methods, and yet
needs to feel confident that the "pass" case of a pass-fail determination
scheme assures health protection. Second, the identified deficiencies are
all easily reparable. Approaches to improve upon the uncertainties
created by the guidance are discussed below.
Regarding the practice of assigning a default baseline risk level for
the pre-CSI start-up condition, there is ample reason to suspect that this
is not sufficiently protective. Since soil and other media cannot be
sampled for CSI emission stream constituents (the CSI is not built yet),
a risk assessor for a CSI can ill-afford to not know the baseline
condition. Thus, where there is an opportunity of any sort to
incorporate real-time data, logic dictates that it should be seized.
Although it may be suggested that the true intent of a CSI risk
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assessment is to document risk levels associated with the facility only
(i.e., independent of all other nearby contaminant influences), this does
not follow from the guidance. In defining the trigger levels that denote
unacceptable risk (e.g., the HI threshold of 0.25), the guidance
demonstrates openly that the case to consider is that of a CSI in a
context of area-wide contamination stemming from other sources. In
light of the above, it would be prudent to have a sampling requirement
to characterize the pre-operation condition for a CSI. As to where
sampling locations for a baseline analysis should be placed, the
installation fenceline is the most obvious choice. As the current
guidance recommends evaluating scenarios at the fenceline for human
health risk, even when actual receptors are not situated there, sampling
at the fenceline would be most the logical choice.
The apparently faulty equations for estimating metal concentrations
in surface soil suggest several recommendations. Early attention to
making all necessary corrections is one essential task. It would seem that
an indispensable task prior to estimating concentrations for the end of
the period of performance would be to plot constituent concentrations
beginning with CSI start-up and throughout a 30-year window. Such an
effort is not typically performed when conducting CSI risk assessments
due to the interest in knowing the concentration only at the end of the
period of performance. By plotting the information, it would become
immediately obvious if the patterns of constituent increase and decay
are reasonable. At a minimum, and for at least a first tier assessment, it
is also recommended that theoretical maximum metals concentrations
(similar to those produced here) be used in each soil concentration-
based scenario under evaluation. Risk assessments that "pass" under
these worst-case conditions would supply the needed confidence that
current CSI risk assessments are lacking.
The seemingly underestimated constituent concentrations at the 20
centimeter soil depth and the misidentified occurrence of maximum
concentrations at this depth can also be easily remedied with the use of
scientifically defensible vadose zone models (e.g., the FRAMES-
MEPAS system) that can well simulate natural fate and transport
processes. These systems can incorporate more site-specific factors than
the equations supplied in the guidance. Unlike the equations supplied in
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the available guidance, these models are easily able to identify the time
at which maximum constituent concentrations occur at depth. To the
extent that the CSI risk assessments intend on evaluating a worst-case
condition, the theoretical maximum surface concentrations are those to
be fed into an appropriate vadose zone model. With this approach it
may become evident with the other CSIs to be evaluated that the 30-
year window commencing with CSI start-up is not that which needs to
be assessed for risk potential when seeking a CSI construction permit.
Importantly, given the time-lags until maximum constituent
concentrations are achieved in subsurface soils, and the variable behavior
of metals in this regard, the merits of evaluating the worst-case scenario
may need to be reviewed. The reasonable maximum exposure scenario
may, with due consideration, prove to be more applicable to the
decision-making process.
If it is assumed that constituent concentrations and exposures are
maximal at the CSI installation fenceline, then ecological receptors
need to be evaluated at this critical location. As a means of bolstering
the ecological risk assessments that follow from use of the available
guidance, including guidance in draft, it is suggested that such
evaluations occur routinely. Furthermore, for the sake of maintaining
parity with the human health risk assessments for CSI, ecological
assessments should be centered about the installation fenceline, even if
available information indicates that key receptors are not found there.
Conclusion
In light of the preceding discussion, improvements to the current
risk assessment methodology should be made. Several points support
this recommendation. First, it is clear from the reading of the guidance
that short-term operation combustion facilities are not their focus.
Second, CSI risk assessments have features that decidedly differ from
those of the conventional incinerator case, including their predictive
nature, evaluation of unique feed components, and evaluation of as
many as four independent furnaces that contribute to emissions. The
non-attention of the present guidance to these features may be
responsible for rendering inaccuracies in CSI risk estimates. Ample time
does not exist, however, to address these differences with the creation
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of a CSI-specific companion to the existing library of combustor
facility guidance. Given the approaching Chemical Weapons
Convention deadline for destruction of the entire chemical stockpile, it
would be prudent to ensure that the current guidance is not enforced
verbatim for the CSI case. Where there are opportunities for
introducing improvements to the guidance, these should proceed in a
site-specific manner.
